Managerial ownership and performance: A commentary essay

Florackis, Kostakis, and Ozkan [Florackis, C., Kostakis, A., and Ozkan, A., 2008. Managerial ownership and performance, Journal of Business Research, forthcoming] empirically examine the exact nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance in the framework of semi-parametric regression. This commentary explores the authors' contribution to the corporate governance literature in the light of recent advances in semi-parametric regression. The commentary also considers how Florackis et al.'s findings align with important, emerging work in the corporate governance literature.     

Managerial labor-market discipline and the characteristics of merger and acquisition transactions

This study evaluates how state regulation of noncompetition agreements affects merger and acquisition activity. Noncompetition agreements put restrictions on postemployment activities, thereby reducing management mobility and forcing top managers to bear the long-term consequences of their corporate decisions. In this sense, state regulation of noncompetition agreements functions as a mechanism to align management's interests with those of the shareholders when management makes major corporate decisions. To examine this hypothesis empirically, this study tests whether the legal enforcement of noncompetition agreements across states affects the choice of payment methods, the premium paid for targets, and the acquirers' abnormal returns on their merger or acquisition activity. The results suggest that stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements significantly reduces the likelihood of using stock in takeovers and the premiums paid for targets. In addition, the study documents that stronger enforcement of noncompetition agreements is related with more favorable market reactions for large acquirers.     

中国汽车行业经营哲学的演变与市场营销近视症评析

本文在介绍西方市场营销观念演变的基础上,着重分析我国汽车行业经营哲学的演变及市场营销近视现状,探讨预防我国汽车行业营销近视的对策。     

Investment,idiosyncratic risk,and growth options

We provide evidence that growth options play an important role in determining the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic risk in the absence of agency problem. A simple real options model predicts that the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic risk is a U-shaped function of the level of idiosyncratic risk: investment responds the most when idiosyncratic risk is at the intermediate level. And the negative relation is stronger when firms possess more growth options. Our results are robust when we control for the effect of managerial risk aversion, supporting the view that firms’ optimal response to uncertainty is an important driving force behind the negative investment–idiosyncratic risk relation.     

Entrepreneurial leadership and MNE subsidiary performance: The moderating role of subsidiary context

Managers of international subsidiaries, especially subsidiary CEOs, operate at critical interfaces within multinational enterprises (MNEs) and hold strategic responsibility for the operations in their country. Yet, their impact on subsidiary performance has received scant research attention. Building on the subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategic leadership literatures, we develop a model of how subsidiary CEOs’ entrepreneurial leadership affects subsidiary performance, and how this relationship is moderated by the subsidiary context that determines managerial discretion. We combine survey data of 291 international subsidiaries in South Korea with archival data to test our hypotheses. Our results show that subsidiary CEOs’ entrepreneurial leadership enhances subsidiary performance and that this relationship is strengthened by managerial discretion. Our study highlights the pivotal role of subsidiary CEOs within MNEs and contributes to a microfoundational understanding of international subsidiary management.     

The unintended consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability

I investigate the impact of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability and predict that clawback provisions will motivate managers to exert more efforts following the adoption of clawback and these efforts will be in the form of an increased managerial efficiency. Using a propensity score matched sample of firms, I find a significant positive association between voluntary clawback adoption and the change in both rank and score of managerial ability. My study highlights the unintended consequences of clawback provisions on CEO's behavior and contributes to the on-going debate on the importance of proactively and carefully drafting clawback policies, further signifying the importance of the SEC's efforts (Rule 10D-1) to enforce clawback policies.     

The undesirable effect of audit quality: Evidence from firm innovation

This study examines whether and how audit quality affects a firm's technological innovation. Using a sample of 7,482 U.S. firms between 2000 and 2009, we demonstrate that high audit quality is associated with lower innovation output, measured by patent counts and patent citations. The effect remains valid after a series of tests for endogeneity issues, alternative measures of audit quality, and different subsamples. We also find that firms with high audit quality attract more non-dedicated institutional investors and financial analysts, who often exert excessive pressure on managers for short-term performance. These pressures, in turn, exacerbate managerial myopia and lead them to forgo investments in innovation. Our findings provide new insights into audit quality by showing its undesirable, most likely unintended, consequences.     

Pricing as a driver of profitable growth: An agenda for CEOs and senior executives

Most CEOs take a narrow, tactical view of pricing and delegate pricing to lower levels of the organization. This myopic approach is costly, as it prevents companies from realizing their potential. In the hands of the best-run companies, pricing is not a battlefield tactic to win a particular competitive skirmish but a transformative long-term strategy for sustained competitive advantage. We present an agenda of six specific action items that defines how to unlock the power of pricing. CEOs and senior executives, our research suggests, should not set prices, but instead, they should create the context, the capabilities, the behaviors, the infrastructure, and the aspirations that enable their organization to excel in pricing.     

Community and compensation: Director remuneration in Thailand

We propose a new theoretical perspective based on mimesis (peer group imitation) to explain non-executive director pay. Arguing that peer group effects may be reinforced by Thai business culture, we test and support our hypothesis on a sample of 523 listed Thai companies from 2010 to 2015. We find that peer group pay is by far the most important and robust determinant of director pay in our sample. Simple peer effects explain almost half of the variation in director pay, and director pay converges to the peer group level over time. A discontinuity regression – a jump in director pay observed when companies are admitted to the SET50 stock market index – indicates a causal effect from peer group pay to director pay.     

Responsibility accounting,managerial action and ‘a counter-ability’: Relating the physical and virtual spaces of decision-making

This study examines how the economic structures of responsibility accounting (RA) affect decision-making and managerial action. It analyses how decision rights transform and affect managerial action and argue that functionalist approaches to organising a company through RA principles are inexpedient. The argument is based on two spaces related to decision-making and managerial action – physical space and virtual space – and addresses the managerial effects of RA with respect to these spaces. The RA literature argues that the design of RA should be based on its context and its structure should be stable. However, the study presented here shows how the effects of RA emerge in a process of development and transformation of the organisation. When an organisation and its management control system cannot embrace the dynamism of the physical space, the resulting managerial actions and decision-making are tumultuous; accountability in this context means possessing ‘a counter-ability’, not being ‘accountable’. Accounting forms a virtual organisational space, and the relationships between physical and virtual spaces co-construct the organisational effects of RA.